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IS U.S. CEO COMPENSATION INEFFICIENT
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE?
John E. Core,* Wayne R. Guay** and Randall S. Thomas***

PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. By Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2004. Pp. 304. Cloth, $24.95.

INTRODUCTION
In Pay Without Performance, Professors Lucian Bebchuk1 and
Jesse Fried2 develop and summarize the leading critiques of current
executive compensation practices in the United States. This book, and
their highly influential earlier article, Managerial Power and Rent
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, with David
Walker3 offer a negative, if mainstream, assessment of the state of U.S.
executive compensation: U.S. executive compensation practices are
failing in a widespread manner, and much systemic reform is needed.
The purpose of our Review is to summarize the book and to offer
some counterarguments to try to balance what is becoming an
increasingly one-sided debate.
The book's thesis is that executive compensation practices in the
U.S. benefit corporate executives at the expense of shareholders
through implicit and explicit corruption of the pay-setting process. It
argues that CEO employment contracts are bad for shareholders (not
"optimal") because they are the product of managerial power.
* Associate Professor of Accounting, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
B.A. 1983, Yale; Ph.D. 1995, University of Pennsylvania. -Ed.
** Associate Professor of Accounting, The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania. B.S. 1989, Clarkson; M.B.A. 1993, Northeastern; Ph.D. 1998, University of
Rochester. - Ed.
*** John S. Beasley II Professor in Law and Business, Vanderbilt University School of
Law; Professor of Management, Owen School of Management, Vanderbilt University. B.A.
1977, Haverford; Ph.D. (Economics) 1983, J.D. 1985, University of Michigan. -Ed.
We would like to acknowledge helpful comments from Iman Anabtawi, Lucian
Bebchuk, Jennifer Blouin, David Larcker, Christian Leuz, Luann Lynch, and Scott
Richardson. All mistakes and omissions are our sole responsibility.
1. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
2. Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall).

3. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U . CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002).
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Managerial power arises, the authors claim, because boards of
directors at public companies are beholden to the firm's top
executives, largely due to management's control over the director
nomination process. Weak compensation committees thus do little to
protect the firm in its pay negotiations with the CEO, leading to levels
of executive pay that are both inappropriately high and have
inappropriately low levels of incentives. The only constraint on this
process is "outrage," either among the firm's shareholders or the
general public. This outrage constraint, however, only polices extreme
cases of executive overcompensation.
In support of this claim, the authors offer a four-part analysis of
CEO pay. In Part I, they begin with a short description and critique of
optimal contracting theory, which posits that executive compensation
arrangements are designed to benefit shareholders. 4 After developing
their arguments against the optimal contracting thesis, they go on in
Part II to explain their version of managerial power theory, in part
through an in-depth analysis of current executive compensation
practices. Having claimed to establish the superiority of managerial
power theory to optimal contracting, in Part III the authors provide a
more detailed critique of the relationship between CEO pay and firm
performance. They assert that the managerial power theory provides a
superior explanation of current practices to the optimal-contracting
perspective. They also draw the strong implication that if such power
exists, it means that something is wrong with the contracting process.
They conclude in Part IV with their policy recommendations to
address what they perceive to be the failings of executive pay
practices.
While we agree with some of the analysis offered in Pay Without
Performance,5 we think it is important to put its arguments into
perspective. In a nutshell, the key issue is whether the problems
Bebchuk and Fried discuss are examples of a few bad apples or are
evidence that the whole barrel is rotten.6 The essence of their claim
that the entire barrel is bad rests on the following assumption: If
contracts are optimal, they do not reflect managerial power, and if

4. As we discuss below in Section II, Bebchuk and Fried do not directly critique optimal
contracting theory, but instead critique the lack of arm's-length contracts, which are a very
restrictive subset of optimal contracts. Because contracts will only be arm's length when
there are no contracting costs and no transactions costs, the arm's-length standard is a
questionable benchmark, and is not typically used by economists, who prefer to examine
whether contracts are optimized to maximize share value net of contracting and transactions
costs.
5. For example, we think some of their policy recommendations have merit and deserve
careful consideration. See infra Part IV for further discussion of some of these points.
6. Bebchuk and Fried introduce their book with the suggestion that the barrel is rotten
by quoting Harvard Business School Dean Kim Clark: "Is it a problem of bad apples, or is it
the barrel?" P. 1 .
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contracts reflect managerial power, they are suboptimal. The authors
view evidence of managerial power as evidence that the system is
failing and that reform is needed.
We agree that it is useful to consider the effect of managerial
power on compensation, but disagree with their interpretation of the
consequences of such power. It is true that contract structures reflect
CEO power, and that CEOs with more power get more pay, but this
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that CEO pay is not
optimized for shareholders, nor does it imply that CEO pay needs
reform.
More generally, our Review points out that Bebchuk and Fried
have missed some important aspects of executive pay and incentives.
As a result, they have not shown that there are systematic failures with
U.S. CEO compensation, and therefore have not shown that reform is
needed.
We try to accomplish this task in the following manner. We begin
in Part I by summarizing what we see as the main themes of the book
in some detail. This overview sets the stage for us in Part II to define
carefully what we understand to be the optimal contract perspective
and managerial power perspective. We then show that in many
settings where managerial power exists, observed contracts anticipate
and try to minimize the costs of this power, and therefore may in fact
be written optimally.7 As a result, the two perspectives are
complementary, not competing, explanations.
In Part III, we examine Bebchuk and Fried's claim that U.S. CEO
compensation is inefficient " pay without performance." We note that
their analysis focuses primarily on whether CEO annual pay varies
with firm performance, and that this perspective ignores the lion's
share of CEOs' incentives: the large holdings of stock and options that
provide powerful performance incentives and ensure that the wealth
of most CEOs varies strongly with their firm's stock price. Thus, we
believe that the authors' claim that CEO pay is "pay without
performance" is based on a mischaracterization of the structure of
U.S. CEO compensation and incentives.
Finally, we conclude by briefly examining some of Bebchuk and
Fried's policy recommendations and summarizing our main points.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

In Pay Without Performance, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse
Fried assert that American executives are vastly overpaid by their
overly friendly boards of directors. Bebchuk and Fried argue that
7. As we discuss in detail in Section II.A below, an optimal contract is not a perfect
contract, but the best contract that can be achieved given the contracting costs in a given
situation.
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current executive pay practices are a sign of widespread corporate
governance failures, a view that they believe to be supported by
scholarly research on executive compensation.
The departure point for their project is the large increases in U.S.
CEO pay between 1992 and 2000.8 Bebchuk and Fried maintain that
current pay arrangements are inefficient and excessive, and are the
result of managerial power and a lack of arm's-length bargaining. On
the other hand, some financial economists are hesitant to conclude
that current pay practices reflect a poorly functioning market for
executive labor and question the generalizability of the managerial
power perspective.9
Bebchuk and Fried argue that the negotiations that take place
between boards and CEOs over pay are distinctly one-sided in favor
of the executive. Boards do not, and cannot, act as effective monitors
of management because their members, even supposedly independent
ones, are beholden to CEOs for a host of financial, social, and
psychological reasons. Other players in the corporate governance field
are either too weak, too unaware of the facts, or too interested in
preserving the status quo, to do anything about it. In short, the thesis
of the book is that the U.S. executive compensation system is broken
and that serious corporate governance reform is needed to fix it.
PART I. THE ARM'S-LENGTH BARGAINING MODEL
Bebchuk and Fried begin with a description of the "official," or
"arm's-length bargaining" model, which they claim informs most
financial economists' research. This model rests on the widely
accepted agency-cost model of the American corporation: diffuse
ownership of large corporations leaves substantial discretion in
professional managers' hands as to how to run the company, and
managers can use this discretion in ways that do not maximize
shareholder value. The resulting agency costs can be reduced through
a variety of methods, including the use of a monitoring board of
directors. Such a board will leave much discretion in the hands of
managers, but oversee executives' actions in an attempt to minimize,
but not eliminate, the agency costs resulting from the separation of
ownership and control.
8. See, e.g., infra Table 2.
9. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, THE STATE OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: WHAT'S RIGHT AND WHAT'S WRONG (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9613, 2003}; Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation:
Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847 (2002).
For two recent surveys of research on executive pay and incentives, see John E. Core et al.,
Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 9 FED. RES. BANK. N.Y. ECON.
POL'Y REV. 27 (2003), and Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
LABOR ECONOMICS 2485 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999).
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As part of the effort to minimize agency costs, executive
compensation is designed to provide incentives that reward managers
for acting in ways that benefit shareholders. Theory predicts that
boards will use schemes that pay each executive their reservation
wage, which is the value of the next-best opportunity available to the
manager, plus a premium for bearing the risk that comes with
incentives that tie the manager's wealth to changes in shareholder
value. These incentives induce the executive to exercise his discretion
to create more shareholder value. When the firm's success depends
heavily upon the decisions and effort level of its executives, then
compensation contracts should be highly incentivized. As the amount
of incentives is increased, however, so is the risk premium that
executives demand, resulting in higher pay. An effective incentive
contract maximizes the benefits of increasing shareholder value
through incentives net the costs of paying for these higher incentives.
Bebchuk and Fried argue that this model assumes that executive
compensation arrangements are the product of "arm's-length
bargaining between the executive and a board seeking to maximize
shareholder value" (p. 18). They then ask the question of whether this
assumption comports with the reality in the marketplace. Here, they
contend the answer is a resounding no.
Directors, in Bebchuk and Fried's view, are heavily biased against
engaging in arm's-length negotiations for CEO pay. They offer a long
list of reasons for this, including: CEOs control, or at least strongly
influence, who sits on the board, and board members want to be
reelected to continue to enjoy the many benefits of board
membership; CEOs can award benefits to directors, directly or
indirectly, by hiring their firms, or contributing to their favorite
charities; CEOs have significant influence over director compensation,
with higher CEO pay being correlated to higher director pay; and a
host of social and psychological factors, such as friendship, loyalty, and
collegiality. On the other side of the equation, directors have relatively
few reasons to oppose higher CEO pay as long as it falls "within the
range of what is considered conventional and acceptable" (p. 36).
Higher pay, claim Bebchuk and Fried, has little direct financial impact
on directors as they usually hold little stock in the company and gain
few or no reputational benefits from holding down CEO pay.
Furthermore, even well-intentioned and hard-nosed compensation
committee members lack the time to do much more than rely on
outside consultants for information and advice, with these advisors
also having strong incentives to give the CEO what they want. 10
10. Bebchuk and Fried further claim that the same dynamic applies to newly hired
outside CEOs because directors have the same incentives to please and get along with them
plus a strong interest in insuring that they get the candidate they want to be the new CEO.
Pp. 39-41.
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Bebchuk and Fried conclude, therefore, that boards are not bargaining
at arm's length with CEOs.
If that is true, then what other meaningful checks exist for
executive pay? Shareholders lack direct power to set compensation for
top managers but do have indirect ways of influencing pay levels
through filing law suits, or voting for shareholder resolutions and
against management-sponsored option plans. Bebchuk and Fried
claim that litigation is a very limited check on excessive executive pay
plans. Courts are ill equipped to judge the desirability of
compensation levels and practices, so judges typically apply the
business judgment rule in evaluating executive pay levels unless there
are serious process problems. In fact, Bebchuk and Fried believe that
"almost all cases since 1900 have refused to overturn compensation
decisions made by the boards of publicly traded firms."11 Nor do they
see much hope of that record changing in the future, despite recent
Delaware court decisions in favor of shareholders challenging
executive compensation.12
In the voting arena, NYSE and NASDAQ rules adopted in 2003
require shareholder votes on all stock option plans. Bebchuk and
Fried, however, do not believe that this will affect executive
compensation levels in a meaningful way, despite research showing
that high negative shareholder votes on option plans lead directors to
reduce the rate of executive pay increases. They claim that option
plans are rarely defeated, that even if such plans are voted down,
boards can still substitute other forms of compensation, and that
shareholders may be hurting themselves by vetoing these plans. They
conclude that "shareholder voting on option plans has been a weak
constraint on compensation arrangements" (p. 51).
Markets represent another potential disciplinary force on
executive pay levels: the managerial labor market, the market for
corporate control, the product market, and the equity capital market
1 1 . P. 46. In support of this claim, Bebchuk and Fried cite a descriptive article by
Professor Barris. P. 46 n.l. They do not mention, however, contrary results in an empirical
analysis of a large number of executive compensation cases by one of the authors of this
review, although they cite the article. This study found that in public company litigation
challenging executive compensation, shareholder plaintiffs have obtained favorable judicial
opinions in different stages of the litigation in thirty-two percent of the cases in that sample.
Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An
Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 588, 611 (2001).
12. In particular, two new Delaware Chancery Court decisions place the burden on
incumbent managers to insure that their own employment contracts are negotiated "in an
adversarial and arm's-length manner." Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated
Health Servs., Inc. v.Elkins, No. 20228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *60 (Aug. 24, 2004)
(emphasis omitted); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 290 (Del. Ch.
2003). These decisions make clear that an officer's fiduciary duties to their corporations
extend to acting "honestly and in good faith so as not to advantage himself at the expense of
the [entity's] shareholders." Official Comm. , 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *60 (alteration in
original).
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may all reduce the likelihood of excessive executive pay. Bebchuk and
Fried claim these markets are weak constraints on managers'
remuneration, though, for several reasons. First, they argue that the
managerial labor market does not reduce, and may actually increase,
CEO pay. Their argument runs as follows: although an internal
promotion for the current CEO is impossible, CEOs can receive
attractive offers from other firms, and may try to behave themselves
with respect to excess pay to increase their attractiveness. Bebchuk
and Fried assert, however, the primary determinant of being hired by
another firm is the executive's performance, not his prior pay level,
and hence executives might as well grab all they can from their current
firm. Furthermore, if the executive receives an external offer of
employment, it will raise the CEO's pay even more as the new firm
will at least match the executive's old pay in order to induce him to
leave.
The market for corporate control is, in Bebchuk and Fried's eyes,
also a weak constraint on executive pay. In theory, high executive
compensation levels could lead to a drop in a firm's stock price and
make the firm more vulnerable to a potential takeover. The fear of a
potential takeover could thus constrain a CEO's demands for higher
pay. The authors note, however, that hostile takeovers are rare these
days and even if one occurs, departing executives are frequently richly
rewarded by "golden parachutes" and other types of payments.
Overall, Bebchuk and Fried claim that executives gain far more from
pay increases than they lose through the increased likelihood of a
takeover that could result from excessive executive pay.
Finally, Bebchuk and Fried deal briefly with the equity and
product markets. They believe that capital markets do not effectively
check executive pay because firms rarely raise equity capital, and even
when they do, high executive pay does not cut off a firm's access to the
equity markets, but just raises the cost of equity. Product markets,
according to the authors, are rarely competitive and thus high CEO
pay merely diverts money away from shareholders into executives'
pockets. Furthermore, high pay is unlikely in Bebchuk and Fried's
view to adversely affect a firm's operational efficiency, and even if it
did, they claim executives would still gain more from higher pay than
they would lose from the increased risk of firm failure. Overall, the
authors conclude that "market forces are unlikely to impose tight
constraints on executive compensation. They may . . . deter managers
from deviating extremely far from arm's-length contracting
arrangements, but overall they permit substantial departures from that
benchmark" (p. 58).
Bebchuk and Fried conclude that the arm's-length bargaining
model, as they describe it, does not adequately explain current
executive compensation practices. Boards are not negotiating CEO
pay using the type of labor negotiating tactics they use with the rank
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and file, and other corporate stakeholders do not, and presently
cannot, force them to do so.
PART II. MANAGERIAL POWER MODEL

Bebchuk and Fried's version of the managerial power model13
begins with the same agency cost model of the corporation used by the
arm's-length negotiation model, but differs in that it sees the pay
setting process as just another agency problem. The board does not
faithfully represent shareholder interests in this model because they
are beholden to the CEO. This gives executives substantial influence
over the board for all of the reasons discussed in Part I. Managers use
their power to get boards to pay them more than they would receive if
there were an arm's-length negotiation. The excess payments, or rents,
constitute the "additional value managers obtain beyond what they
would get in arm's-length bargaining with a board that had both the
inclination to maximize shareholder value and the necessary time and
information to perform that task properly" (p. 62).
The difficult problem posed by this claim is how to determine
whether such rents are being paid. We can observe actual
compensation, but how do we know what amount a shareholder
value-maximizing board would pay? Bebchuk and Fried finesse this
point by claiming that all they need to show is that managers with
more power over boards will get more pay and that that pay will be in
forms that are less performance sensitive.
They do not maintain, however, that managers will receive all of
the firm's rents. Market forces and board monitoring limit deviations
from the arm's-length pay model. Other stakeholders also have some

13. The managerial power theory is not a new one. In 1932, Berle and Means observed
that with the diffusion of stock ownership in modern corporations, executives could exercise
great power over others' assets. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER c. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4, 6-7, passim (1934). Nor were the
implications of managerial power for executive pay unnoticed. Berle and Means recognized
that the allocation of rents among the firm's factors of production was affected by the
separation of ownership and control. They advocated giving "any surplus which can be made
over a satisfactory return to the investor" to management in order to provide "an incentive
to action." Id. at 343.
While it took other scholars longer to apply managerial power theory to executive
compensation practices, at least one early version of the theory surfaced in the 1950s.
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (1959) (arguing that
managerial pay increases with firm size thereby rewarding managers for engaging in empire
building). By the 1990s there were a host of articles applying the managerial power theory to
executive compensation practices. For example, in the business school literature, Lambert,
Larcker and Weigelt provide a succinct summary, and empirical verification, of the
"Managerial Power Model," focusing on many of the same questions being explored by
Bebchuk and Fried. Richard A. Lambert et al., The Structure of Organizational Incentives,
38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 438, 441-42 (1993) (defining managerial power as "the ability of managers
to influence or exert their will or desires on the remuneration decisions made by the board
of directors, or perhaps the compensation committee of the board").
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impact on the board's negotiations through what Bebchuk and Fried
label as "outrage," which they define as "negative reactions by
outsiders" (p. 65). The costs created from this reaction lead the
directors to avoid certain compensation packages because stron�
negative reactions to pay packages can increase support for takeovers,
attract negative attention to the board, and harm directors'
reputations.
Outsiders will only react adversely to pay packages if they perceive
them to be outrageous. If the designers of a compensation scheme can
disguise the manager's rent extraction, there will not be substantial
opposition to it. Bebchuk and Fried claim that managers indeed
camouflage pay packages in order to hide compensation and legitimize
the amount of managerial rents paid out (p. 67).
Compensation consultants, they claim, often have an important
role to play in this subterfuge. First, the consultant develops and
recommends the CEO's pay package, so that directors need only
approve it. This protects the directors from judicial challenges as they
can point to the outside expert's recommendation as cover for their
actions. Second, the compensation consultant is even more vulnerable
to pressure from the CEO than the directors, because she knows that
displeasing the top executive will mean the end of further employment
by the firm. This can cut off the consultant's firm from lucrative
assignments with the company's human resource department that pay
far more than its much smaller role of advising on the CEO's pay.
Third, compensation consultants respond to this pressure by using
their discretion to justify pay arrangements that are strongly in the
CEO's favor. For example, the surveys of comparable CEOs' pay that
are given to compensation committees can be tailored to include
favorable comparison groups so as to justify big pay increases for the
firm's CEO. Bebchuk and Fried claim that these pay surveys have
contributed to the steady increase in CEO pay, as each company
ratchets its CEO's pay above the average pay level year after year.
Turning to the predictions of their managerial power model,
Bebchuk and Fried focus on the claim that managers with more power
will get paid more and have compensation packages that are less
sensitive to performance. They argue that CEOs will have more power
when boards are weak, when there is no large outside shareholder,
when there are fewer institutional shareholders, and when the
company has stronger takeover defenses (p. 80). In support of their
first claim, Bebchuk and Fried offer five main groups of studies. These
studies show that CEOs receive more pay and less performance
sensitive pay when boards: (1) have a greater number of members; (2)
have more than three of their directors serving on multiple boards; (3)
appoint the CEO as chairman of the board; (4) have a higher
percentage of directors appointed by the CEO; and (5) are
interlocking. In a related vein, CEOs are better-paid when the CEO
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appoints the head of the compensation committee, or there are
insiders on the compensation committee. They are paid less as the
level of stock ownership of the directors on the compensation
committee increases.
Bebchuk and Fried next discuss how better shareholder
monitoring can reduce pay. Thus, the presence of large (five percent
or more) shareholders is correlated with reduced CEO pay. Similarly,
companies with greater institutional shareholder ownership have
lower CEO pay and more pay for performance, although this impact is
affected by the presence of business relationships between the
institutions and the firm.
The authors' final point is that better protection against hostile
takeovers correlates with increased executive pay. Their argument is
bolstered by a study showing that the adoption of antitakeover
defenses is accompanied by CEO pay increases. In a similar manner,
CEOs appear to reduce their stockholdings in their firms after the
passage of antitakeover legislation that applies to the company.
In Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine, Bebchuk and Fried seek to
illustrate the managerial power thesis with examples of particular
corporate pay practices. Chapter Seven focuses on severance
payments made to departing CEOs which are not contractually
required by their employment contracts, what they call "gratuitous"
payments (p. 87). They claim that these payments are frequently made
when a CEO is fired, when the firm is acquired, and when the CEO
retires. For instance, when a board terminates the company's CEO, it
may grant the departing executive substantial monetary and other
benefits which are not called for by the CEO's contract. Bebchuk and
Fried claim that such payments reflect the need to get some directors
to acquiesce in the firing, or to sweeten their action with a gift. But in
the authors' view, such payments reflect a generosity not seen in
arm's-length bargaining.
Post-acquisition payments to departing executives, either by the
target or the acquirer, are common and frequently far in excess of
contractually required payments. The authors claim that the best
explanation for target-company payments is managerial power over
the board: the target's board will only approve the deal if departing
management is treated generously, or at least will prefer a deal where
managers get special treatment. From the acquirer's side, it may be
willing to make such payments as part of a deal to get better terms
from target management. Lower acquisition premiums are correlated
with higher payments to departing managers, according to recent
research.
A similar dynamic exists, Bebchuk and Fried claim, when CEOs
retire. Boards agree to large "gratuitous" payments in this situation
because of their close personal relationships with the CEO, or out of
gratitude for what the CEO has done for them. Since these payments
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don't have to be publicly disclosed, they are camouflaged from
outsiders and the outrage constraint does not operate.
Excessive retirement benefits are the subject of Chapter Eight.
Bebchuk and Fried claim that firms have shifted compensation into
post-retirement payments and benefits because there are very weak
disclosure obligations for these forms of compensation. Unlike other
forms of pay, which must be disclosed in the summary compensation
table, the increase in value of an executive's pension plan, or the
increase in value of a deferred compensation arrangement, is not
disclosed in the summary compensation table. Bebchuk and Fried
claim that this permits boards to "camouflage" rent extraction through
the use of guaranteed retirement pensions, deferred compensation,
post-retirement perks, and guaranteed consulting fees. Each of these
four forms of payment is unrelated to firm performance.
Executive pension plans are a form of deferred compensation.
They differ from other employees' retirement plans in that they are
not tax-qualified. A Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan (SERP)
is a plan designed to equalize "reverse discrimination" of retirement
programs for executives and highly compensated employees. "Reverse
discrimination" happens as a result of the limits put on qualified
pension plans such as 401(k) plans and profit-sharing plans, so that
highly compensated employees receive or can deposit a much lower
percentage of their pay into these plans. Because most executives are
paid more than the ERISA limit of $200,000, boards cannot use tax
advantaged qualified plans, and instead use nonqualified SERPs. As
discussed in Scholes et al.,14 the tax efficiency of deferred
compensation plans relative to current compensation depends on the
firm's and manager's current and future tax rates. Bebchuk and Fried
show assumptions under which these plans seem tax inefficient in that
they appear to shift some tax burdens to the employer.15 The fact that
firms offer such plans only to executives confirms, in Bebchuk and
Fried's eyes, their inefficiency. Nevertheless, companies use them, the
authors claim, because the SEC's poor disclosure rules do not reveal
the enormous size of these promised payments in the summary
compensation table.
Post-retirement perks are another sign of managerial power over
the pay-setting process, according to Bebchuk and Fried. Here, they

14. MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING
APPROACH 181 -83 (2004).
15. If the deferred plan promises a payout linked to a stock index such as the S&P 500, it
is generally more efficient to let the executive save in this index for himself (because be can
achieve a lower tax rate on capital gains than the firm can). On the other hand, if the
deferred payout is a fixed annuity, as is more common, both the executive and the firm are
taxed at ordinary income rates, and the relative efficiency of the firm's saving for the
executive is determined by the firm's and the executive's relative income tax rates.

May 2005]

Pay Without Performance

1153

focus on a variety of perks, including retired CEOs' use of corporate
aircraft for personal reasons. These types of in-kind benefits are a less
efficient way of compensating retired executives than equivalent cash
payments, and are never offered to lower-level employees. The
authors assert, however, that such benefits have the advantage of not
showing up in the firm's disclosures and thus being largely invisible to
outsiders.
Consulting contracts are the final post-retirement benefit that
Bebchuk and Fried point to in support of the managerial power
hypothesis. These contracts pay retired CEOs large sums of money for
a relatively small amount of, and sometimes no, consulting with their
replacements. Again, the authors argue these contracts are nothing
more than camouflaged severance payments that need not be
disclosed by the firm and therefore do not risk triggering an adverse
reaction from the public or corporate stakeholders.
Chapter Nine discusses the once-widely-used, but now defunct,
practice of firms extending below-market rate of interest loans to their
top executives. Although this practice was outlawed by the Sarbanes
Oxley Act of 2002, Bebchuk and Fried believe that the former
practices provide a "nice illustration of camouflage. "16 Companies
provided these loans to executives, the authors say, ostensibly to
permit them to purchase the firms' stock. While forty percent of these
loans actually assisted executives in purchasing more of their
companies' stock, many others were used for purposes unrelated to
the executive's job.
Bebchuk and Fried argue that these loans were merely disguised
and inefficient compensation payments. Their existence was disclosed
but the size of the interest rate subsidy was difficult to calculate.
Furthermore, many of these loans were later forgiven by the company,
but the value of this benefit was only disclosed after the forgiveness
had taken place, usually when the executive left the company, even if
there was a prior contractual obligation to do so. Again, the authors
claim this minimized any outrage over the payment by postponing it
until after the executive was gone.
In summary, Part II makes the case that executive pay
arrangements are influenced by the CEO's power, rather than being
negotiated on an arm's-length basis. Directors try to hide that fact,
Bebchuk and Fried claim, by obscuring the amounts of compensation
being paid. This obfuscation minimizes any pressure on them to
reduce pay levels and curb abusive practices.

16. P. 1 12. Furthermore, one billion dollars of Joans that were outstanding at the time
that Sarbanes-Oxley was passed were exempted so the compensation involved continues to
be significant at present. Id.
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PART III. DECOUPLING PAY FROM PERFORMANCE
In Part III, Bebchuk and Fried try to document their claim that
executive compensation is linked only tenuously to managerial
performance, which they see as further evidence (and a big cost) of
managerial power. Chapter Ten is focused on nonequity
compensation, such as salary, bonus plans, acquisition bonuses, signing
bonuses, split-dollar life insurance policies, and severance payments.
The authors argue that each one of these forms of compensation is not
tied, or is only weakly tied, to performance. Bebchuk and Fried see
Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, which is supposed to
limit non-performance-based pay, as easily circumvented.
Bebchuk and Fried begin by summarizing research that
demonstrates that salary and bonus payments did not correlate with
managerial performance in the 1990s, and that executives are
sometimes rewarded for stock price increases that are unrelated to the
executive's own performance. Similarly, in many cases, bonus plans
may pay executives even for poor performance and give boards
substantial discretion to make awards, or to lower targets. This is
inconsistent, they claim, with tying executive pay to managerial
performance.
The delinkage of pay and performance is further illustrated, the
authors believe, by the many "gratuitous" payments made to top
executives, such as bonuses for acquisitions that are sometimes paid to
CEOs at acquiring firms, despite the frequent stock price declines
experienced by these firms following the purchase. If acquisitions are
value-decreasing events for acquiring firm shareholders, Bebchuk and
Fried note, why are boards giving CEOs strong incentives to make
them?
The authors also criticize the current form of severance packages
for departing executives for being too soft on poor performance. They
argue that boards should deny large severance payments to CEOs
when their firms perform well below the level of their competitors.
Careful contract design could limit this punishment to poor
performers and still provide sufficient protections for any CEO
terminated despite a strong managerial showing.
Stock options are the subject of the other four chapters in Part III.
The main argument Bebchuk and Fried make is that while properly
designed stock option plans should be valuable incentives for
managers to produce shareholder value, the plans widely used today
"have delivered a considerable amount of pay without performance
and packaged that pay so that it seems defensible and legitimate" (p.
138). Put slightly differently, they believe that current stock option
plans deviate from the plans that would be negotiated at arm's length,
and that those deviations systematically favor managers.
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In Chapter Eleven, Bebchuk and Fried argue that stock option
plans do not filter out windfalls, that is, "substantial gains for
managers that do not result from their own performance" (p. 138).
They argue options should be designed to reward only firm-specific
price movements, not general market conditions. Indexed options, or
other similar products, Bebchuk and Fried state, would do a better job
than current plans of creating incentives for managers at a lower cost,
and those savings could be used to provide managers with more high
powered incentive compensation.
Few companies use indexed options, however, which the authors
claim stems from managerial power over the pay-setting process.
Managers prefer options that reward them for general market price
increases because those generate more compensation for less effort.
Furthermore, indexed options might focus attention on poorly
performing CEOs, thus embarrassing them in front of directors and
peers. Nevertheless, Bebchuk and Fried state, boards can get away
with using unindexed options because these options enjoy
unwarranted legitimacy in the eyes of outsiders.
In Chapter Twelve, Bebchuk and Fried critique the various
justifications offered as to why conventional stock options are used
instead of indexed options. One reason for the use of these plans is
that they are accorded preferential accounting treatment in
comparison with the indexed or performance-conditioned options the
authors advocate. Conventional options thereby result in higher
reported earnings over their competitors and higher reported earnings
can enhance share value if the market for the company's stock is not
informationally efficient.
Though conceding this claim might be true, Bebchuk and Fried
contend that it does not lead to the conclusion that the lack of indexed
options is the result of arm's-length contracting. First of all, even if
there would be a short-term share price drop from adopting indexed
options, there could be substantial offsetting benefits as executives'
incentives are sharpened. Second, Bebchuk and Fried assert that
institutional investors favor indexed options despite their potential
adverse impact on reported earnings, which suggests to the authors
that shareholders are not concerned about the accounting effect.
Third, in the past few years many firms have begun to voluntarily
expense options, yet they continue to use conventional options,
suggesting that the accounting rationale is not the real reason they
have not adopted indexed options. Finally, many managers have
lobbied to stop the FASB from requiring firms to expense
conventional options. The authors claim that managers want to stop
the FASB because expensing would make the size of their option
payments more salient and would eliminate their justification for not
switching to indexed options. Bebchuk and Fried find it unsurprising
that these same executives have not tried to convince the F ASB to
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change the accounting treatment for indexed options to level the
playing field.
The remaining chapters in Part III of Pay Without Performance
discuss various aspects of equity-based compensation that Bebchuk
and Fried feel further demonstrate managerial power over the pay
setting process: the widespread use of at-the-money options, option
repricing, reload options, restricted stock in lieu of options, and
executives' ability to unwind their equity positions. Beginning with at
the-money options, the authors cbserve that they are used by virtually
every public company in the U.S., even though out-of-the-money
options "generate much higher pay-for-performance sensitivity per
dollar of expected value . . . [a]nd there is empirical evidence
suggesting that giving managers out-of-the-money options rather than
at-the-money options does, on average, boost firm value" (p. 161).
According to Bebchuk and Fried, this pattern would not be observed
in an arm's-length setting, but rather only exists because at-the-money
options give managers the greatest amount of "rents" without creating
much "outrage." Moreover, managers can manipulate the timing of
corporate disclosures and option grants to increase the options' value.
Repricing of stock options is another area where managers use
their power over boards to get more for themselves, say the authors.
Repricings occur when firms either drop the exercise price for existing
options or alternatively issue new options at a lower exercise price to
replace existing ones. Although proponents frequently maintain that
such changes are needed to retain existing managers or to protect
option holders from adverse stock price movements unrelated to
managerial performance, Bebchuk and Fried assert that neither
justification holds up well under scrutiny. They find the managerial
power explanation a more logical one - managers want conventional
options that get repriced when stock prices fall, rather than indexed
options, because the former generate bigger gains for them. The
superficially plausible justifications of improved retention and
protection from unrelated adverse stock price movements serve to
minimize any dissent by outsiders.
Bebchuk and Fried offer a related critique of reload options.
Reload options permit executives to lock in the benefits from
increases in their company's stock price even when the long-term
returns of holding the firm's stock are flat. Proponents of these
options claim they encourage early exercise of options and greater
stock holdings by executives. The authors say this is just a pretext for
paying executives more money because nothing prevents executives
from selling the additional shares they get when they exercise these
options and that managers, in fact, do just that. Bebchuk and Fried
assert that firms could increase managers' stock ownership much more
cheaply by simply requiring them to hold those shares they get from
exercising options.
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Chapter Thirteen concludes with a strong critique of the current
movement toward replacing conventional stock options with restricted
stock. Bebchuk and Fried believe this amounts to replacing an at-the
money option with a zero-price option, increasing executive windfalls
even when the stock price falls below its grant-date price (p. 171).
They are unpersuaded by claims that restricted stock is particularly
valuable because it requires executives to hold shares longer, since
that holding requirement could be easily included in a conventional
option plan. They also believe restricted stock is an expensive method
of preserving managerial incentives (in comparison to indexed
options) in the face of declining stock prices.
The concluding chapter in Part III analyzes executives' freedom to
sell their company stock and options. Bebchuk and Fried state that
managers have almost unfettered discretion to sell their vested stock
and options, which weakens their incentives to maximize shareholder
value or provides them a windfall if firms try to maintain these
incentives by granting additional equity. Even with respect to
unvested stock and options, the authors assert that executives
"generally have been allowed to hedge away their equity exposure
before these instruments vest" (p. 177). While managers benefit
greatly from this freedom, Bebchuk and Fried believe that firms
should, in many instances, prohibit managers from selling their shares
and options so as to preserve their beneficial incentive effects.
A second aspect of this problem, the authors argue, is that
managers have almost total control over when they unload their stock
and options. This freedom gives managers the opportunity to engage
in insider trading through their informational advantage over
outsiders. Although many companies have insider-trading policies that
limit when executives can trade their shares, Bebchuk and Fried claim,
"these trading windows and blackout periods have not been designed
to effectively prevent managers from trading profitably on their inside
information" (p. 181). This pattern is consistent, in the authors' eyes,
with the managerial-power hypothesis because insider trading benefits
executives in a way outsiders are unlikely to notice. They do
acknowledge that the improved disclosure rules of Sarbanes-Oxley
will reduce the profitability of this form of insider trading, but claim
that the historical practice still supports their overall view of executive
pay practices as skewed sharply in managers' favor. Since firms could
prohibit all such abuses by contract, the authors argue, this is another
illustration of the perverse effects of managerial power. Finally,
Bebchuk and Fried note that executives' freedom to unwind their
equity positions with the company could give them incentives to
manipulate their company's stock price to maximize the short-term
value of their holdings.
In short, Part III of Pay Without Performance makes the case that
equity-based compensation in its current form is too costly and often
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fails to generate the proper incentives to maximize shareholder value
- both because of the decoupling of pay and performance, and
because of the creation of perverse incentives to misreport results, to
suppress bad news, and to choose projects that are not transparent.
PART IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The concluding section of Pay Without Performance focuses on the
policy implications of Bebchuk and Fried's analysis. They divide their
recommendations into two chapters: Chapter Fifteen proposes
changes to current executive-compensation arrangements and Chapter
Sixteen broadens the inquiry to cover the relationship between
shareholders and boards. The former chapter is partly a summary of
proposals sprinkled throughout the earlier parts of the book:
institutional investors should push firms: (1) to index options, (2) to
eliminate restricted stock grants and generous severance packages that
are not tied to managers' performance, and (3) to limit managers'
freedom to unload equity incentives. There are also several other
policy interventions, however, brought forward for the first time.
Increased transparency in executive pay disclosures would, in
Bebchuk and Fried's view, help outsiders understand corporate
executives' compensation arrangements and thereby check the use of
their less-desirable elements. The authors propose four mandatory
rules: option expensing, monetary valuation of all forms of
compensation, disclosure on how market movements affect option
values recognized by executives, and restrictions on managers' sale of
options and stock. In each case, the authors stress that adopting the
rule would make it easier for shareholders and other outsiders to
determine the size of executive pay packages or the effect of
managers' performance on their pay.
Compensation committee practices are very briefly considered as a
second, albeit limited, source for improving the executive pay system.
The authors believe that while current practices can be improved,
these changes can only address carelessness and insufficient attention,
which are not the main problems today.
The final proposal Bebchuk and Fried make in Chapter Fifteen is
to require shareholder approval of equity-based plans and of specific
"suspect" compensation arrangements. NYSE and NASDAQ rule
changes in 2003 required listed companies to put option plans up for a
shareholder vote, thereby implementing the first of these two ideas.
Shareholder approval of "suspect" practices, such as option repricing,
has been proposed by some institutional investors, but has yet to be
mandated. In both instances, the authors acknowledge that these
changes will have only a limited effect on executive pay.
Yet, in the end, Bebchuk and Fried conclude that none of these
changes is likely to fix the system. Rather, executive compensation
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problems arise because, under current arrangements, boards cannot
be relied upon to effectively scrutinize and monitor the decisions and
activities of their CEOs. They see Sarbanes-Oxley's emphasis on
director independence and paying directors with stock as steps in the
right direction, but ones that can never provide sufficient affirmative
incentives for directors to maximize shareholder value. They hold out
more hope for the SEC's proposal to permit shareholders to nominate
candidates for the board in limited circumstances, although they say it
does not go far enough (p. 208-10).
Instead, Bebchuk and Fried argue that recent corporate
govemance reforms need to be augmented by making directors
directly accountable to shareholders. They believe that only by
reducing takeover defenses, giving shareholders more power to
change corporate rules, and opening up the nomination process to
facilitate direct shareholder nomination of whole slates of directors,
will the fundamental problems of the executive pay system be cured.
In their view, none of the problems identified by defenders of the
current nomination system - distraction of corporate management,
increased influence for special interests such as labor unions,
shareholder myopia, and paternalistic protection of shareholders from
themselves - justify maintaining the current system with all of its
flaws. In short, Bebchuk and Fried conclude that directors' insulation
from shareholders is the root of all of the problems in executive
compensation.
II. THE EXISTENCE OF MANAGERIAL POWER DOES NOT IMPLY
THAT CONTRACTS ARE SUBOPTIMAL
Bebchuk and Fried's central claim is that the managerial power
perspective explains executive pay arrangements better than what
they term "the official 'view' of executive compensation - that
boards, bargaining at arm's length with CEOs, negotiate pay
arrangements designed to serve shareholder interests" (p. 15). The
main problem with this claim is that in no sense is arm's-length
contracting an official view among scholars. Arm's-length contracting
amounts to a standard of theoretical perfection, and such a contract
would only exist in a perfect world without frictions such as
contracting costs and transactions costs. As such, it is not a relevant
benchmark. Saying that there is something wrong with a contract
because it is not arm's length is akin to saying that there is something
wrong with a tank that does not perform well on a racetrack (where
there are small frictions) because it has been designed to operate in
the desert (where there are large frictions).
As recognized and discussed by Bebchuck, Fried, and Walker
(2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003), what a large body of
mainstream scholars espouse instead, and what may be fairly termed
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an "official view," is optimal contracting theory, which posits that
contracts are designed to maximize shareholder value net of
contracting costs and transactions costs. This is a reasonable
alternative hypothesis with which to compare the predictions of
managerial power theory. As we show below, in many settings where
managerial power exists, observed contracts anticipate and try to
minimize the costs of this power, and therefore may in fact be written
optimally. As a result, the optimal contracting and managerial power
perspectives are not competing explanations. It is true that contract
structures reflect CEO power, and that CEOs with more power get
more pay, but this fact does not mean that CEO pay is not optimized
for shareholders, nor does it imply that CEO pay needs reform. The
first step is to define optimal contracts, managerial power, and related
terms.
A.

What Is an Optimal Contract?

In this review, and similar to Bebchuk and Fried, we use the terms
"optimal contracts" and "efficient contracts" as synonyms. We follow
Core, Guay, and Larcker, and define an "optimal contract" or
"efficient contract" as "one that maximizes the net expected economic
value to shareholders after transactions costs (such as contracting
costs) and payments to employees. An equivalent way of saying this is
that . . . contracts minimize agency costs."17 Bebchuk, Fried, and
Walker similarly define an "optimal contract" as "one that minimizes
agency costs (that is, the sum of contracting costs, monitoring costs,
other costs incurred in achieving a certain level of compliance with the
principal's interest) and the costs of the residual divergence."18 These
definitions highlight the ·key role contracting costs play in determining
what governance systems are optimal.
The use of the word "optimal," while standard in the literature,
can cause confusion. Optimal does not mean perfect, but the best
contract that can be achieved to maximize shareholder value given the
contracting costs in a given situation. This perspective is well
summarized by Jensen and Meckling:
[F]inding that agency costs are non-zero (i.e., that there are costs
associated with the separation of ownership and control in the
corporation) and concluding therefrom that the agency relationship is
non-optimal, wasteful or inefficient is equivalent in every sense to
comparing a world in which iron ore is a scarce commodity (and
therefore costly) to a world in which it is freely available at zero resource
cost, and concluding that the first world is "non-optimal" - a perfect

17. Core et al., supra note 9, at 27.
18. Bebchuk, et

al., supra note

3, at 761-62.
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example of the fallacy criticized by Coase and what Demsetz
characterizes as the "Nirvana" form of analysis.19
Consistent with this view, when we argue below that many
contracts with managers may in fact be optimal, we are not claiming
that U.S. corpcrate governance is perfect, or as economists sometimes
say, "first best efficient." Nor are we claiming that contracts meet
Bebchuk and Fried's standard of arm's-length contracting. What we
mean is that U.S. corporate governance may in fact be extremely good
given the existence of information costs, transactions costs, and the
existing U.S. legal and regulatory system. Conceivably, improved
regulation or other changes to the contracting environment could
lower contracting costs and improve overall governance by, for
example, making boards more independent and effective monitors.
This is an important point, to which we will return when we discuss in
Part IV how any changes to macro-level governance features (such as
a regulation that all directors must be independent) must consider the
costs of these changes (such as the fact that there is a limited pool of
well-qualified independent directors) as well as the benefits. For this
Section and next two Sections, however, we hold the existing U.S.
contracting environment fixed and address the question of whether
compensation structures are written optimally within our current
system. This means that, for the moment, we address optimality at the
firm level, not at the overall domestic or global economy level. In
Section 11.D, we tum to the question of optimality at the global
economy level.
As an example of the importance of contracting costs, consider the
differences in contracting in the U.S. and in Italy.20 As discussed by
Shleifer and Vishny,21 and by Bebchuk in other work,22 Italy's weaker
legal system makes it easier for insiders to "expropriate" or steal from
outside shareholders. This systemic weakness increases contracting
costs in Italy. These greater costs result from the fact that the contract
needs to be written to prevent expropriation, because the legal system
does not. As a consequence of these higher contracting costs, optimal

19. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Agency Costs and the Theory of the Firm,
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 328 (1976) (citations omitted).
20. This is an example of the general phenomenon that weaker legal and political
systems are associated with higher contracting costs and different contracting outcomes. See,
e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1 131 (1997).
When contracting costs are high, the type of contracts that will be used is different;
moreover, high contracting costs mean that the optimal contract will permit higher agency
costs, and higher agency costs mean that less net value is given to outside shareholders.
21. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN.
737, 742 (1997).
22. LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK, A RENT PROTECTION THEORY OF CORPORATE
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 3, 24 (Nat') Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7203, 1999).
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ownership structures in Italy leave much more control in the hands of
insiders than do those in the U.S. Greater insider ownership forces
Italian managers to internalize the costs of their private benefits. An
interpretation of the greater agency costs stemming from this weak
legal system is that the Italian contracting environment is less efficient
than the U.S. contracting environment. Because outside shareholders
in Italy fear expropriation, they are less willing to provide capital, and
the Italian stock market is much smaller on a per capita basis than the
U.S. stock market.
The assumption that the Italian contracting environment is less
efficient than the U.S. system, however, does not imply that Italian
firms are writing suboptimal contracts or that managers in Italy are
extracting unexpected private benefits. Italian firms may be
contracting optimally given the high costs imposed by their suboptimal
legal system. If the Italian legal system could be improved at low cost,
or if an Italian company could move to the U.S. at low cost,
shareholder wealth would go up because contracting costs go down.
The fact that neither of these adjustments have occurred (at least for
most Italian firms) suggests that the adjustments are very costly, and
the persistence of these costs does not imply that Italian firms are
operating or contracting inefficiently within their environment.
B.

A Contract Does Not Need to Be A rm 's L ength to Be Optimal

Although Bebchuk and Fried suggest that if a contract is not an
arm's-length contract, then it is not an optimal contract, this inference
is not correct. 23 By arm's-length contract, the authors mean a contract
that is written by a completely independent board (or equivalently, a
board that is completely dependent on shareholder· interests). An
independent board, however, is not necessary for an optimal contract.
As Bebchuk and Fried note, in most cases, a corporate board is not
completely independent of the CEO (e.g., internally promoted CEOs
will know the board members, and even externally hired CEOs are
likely to know at least some of the board members). It may be too
costly and therefore not optimal for the board to be completely
independent because the board has many other responsibilities
besides contracting with executives about compensation, and these
responsibilities are often best fulfilled by a nonindependent board. 24

23. For an example of this suggestion, see p. 20 under the heading "Efficient Contracting
and Paying for Performance," where Bebchuk and Fried suggest that a contract not
consistent with the arm's-length model is inefficient or not optimal.

24. In the extreme, the independence of directors could be enhanced by requiring that
directors serve only one one-year term at a given firm, and at the end of the year the entire
board would be replaced. While this would make it very difficult for the CEO to gain power
over and compromise the independence of directors, it would likely come at a very high cost.
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For example, the board provides input into project selection and
investments. A board that is optimized for project selection and
investment decisions may contain insiders and thus not be
independent of the CEO. Fama and Jensen make this point by noting
that since the board is to be comprised of experts, it is natural that the
most influential members are internal managers with valuable firm
specific information about the organization.25 A board that is
optimized for making compensation decisions could destroy value by
making bad decisions on more crucial items.26 Thus, the board
structure that maximizes overall share value may not be comprised
entirely of independent directors. In this case, the optimal
compensation contract with the CEO is not the one that results from
the arm's-length bargaining of an independent board: it is the one that
maximizes net shareholder value given that the board is optimized to
perform several functions.
Just as in our Italian example, a contract can maximize net
shareholder value, even in the absence of arm's-length contracting,
given market and legal constraints. One cannot determine whether a
compensation contract is optimal by examining the contracting
environment in isolation. It is also necessary to consider whether the
board of directors has been optimized over parameters beyond
independence from the manager. The key point Bebchuk and Fried
ignore is that an optimal board structure minimizes overall agency
costs, not just the cost of compensating managers.
C.

The Existence of Managerial Power Does Not Show That
Contracts A re Suboptimal

Bebchuk and Fried introduce and describe the managerial power
perspective as follows:
After analyzing the shortcomings of the arm's-length contracting view, we
turn . . . to the managerial power perspective on executive compensation.
The same factors that limit the usefulness of the arm's-length model
suggest that executives have had substantial influence over their own
pay. Compensation arrangements have often deviated from arm's-length
contracting because directors have been influenced by management,
sympathetic to directors, insufficiently motivated to bargain over
compensation, or simply ineffectual in overseeing compensation.
Executives' influence over directors has enabled them to obtain "rents"

25. Eugene F. Fama & Michael
301, 314 (1983).

C.

Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.

FIN. ECON.

26. For a discussion of the idea that the board is structured to optimize competing
objectives, see Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an
Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 FED. RES.
BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV. 7 (2003).
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benefits greater than those obtainable under true arm 's-length
(pp. 4-5; emphasis added)
In short, they view managerial power as equivalent to contracting that
deviates from arm's-length bargaining, and therefore imply that
managerial power necessarily results in suboptimal contracting and
excess pay. In the prior Section, we explained why the lack of an
independent board and the resulting managerial power does not imply
suboptimal contracting. In this Section, we further argue that just
because a CEO attains managerial power does not imply that the
CEO receives excess pay.
In many contracting settings, managerial power is unavoidable.
Before hiring a manager, the shareholders and board know that a
successful executive will grow powerful and exert more influence on
the board over time (indeed, it may well be optimal to yield power and
discretion over time to talented managers that demonstrate a valuable
understanding of the firm's business environment).27 Ex post growth in
managerial power, however, says nothing about whether contracting
with this manager is suboptimal, ex ante. That is, when a new CEO is
hired, optimal contracts are expected to be structured ex ante to take
into consideration that the CEO will ex post build managerial power
over time. Such contracts will ensure that, in expectation, the CEO
does not earn excess pay.28 For example, shareholders may place limits
on shares reserved for stock options and restricted stock grants, place
limits on the magnitude and form of perquisite consumption, or
carefully structure board-selection rules or shareholder-approval rules
to slow the growth in managerial power. The key point here is that
simply showing, at a given point in time, that a manager has power
says little about whether a firm has contracted optimally with the
manager, or whether the manager earns excess pay in expectation over
his or her tenure as manager. To show that the power is suboptimal,
one must take the further step to show that it leads to bad outcomes
for shareholders.
Returning to our example of Italy, their weak legal system makes it
impossible ex post to stop insiders from gaining power and using this
power to expropriate wealth from outside shareholders. But this need
bargaining ..

27. Benj amin E. Hennalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of
Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 96 (1998).
28. As noted in the previous Section, the manager may already have power at the time
of his initial employment. This initial power will allow the manager to earn pay greater than
he could with arm's-length bargaining. An optimal contract in this setting will minimize the
cost of this power and the costs of anticipated growth in power over time. Thus it will take
into account the fact that the initial contract will have a limited life of say three to five years.
See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For? (Oct. 21, 2004) (unpublished working
paper) (documenting length of CEO employment contracts and finding that the most
common lengths are three and five years).
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not stop Italian firms from writing ex ante optimal contracts with
insiders that anticipate expropriation and minimize its expected cost.
Under the assumption that the residual agency problems and
deadweight losses from the contracting process are greater in Italy
than in the U.S., contracting and governance are more efficient in the
U.S. The existence of larger residual agency problems and managerial
power in Italy, however, does not imply that Italian managers receive
greater excess pay than U.S. managers. Assuming shareholders in
Italian firms recognize these greater agency costs, they will structure
contracts optimally to constrain excess pay. Of course, some firms may
contract suboptimally with managers, and for these firms, agency costs
will not be minimized and managers will receive excess pay. But the
critical point is that the existence of large residual agency problems
does not imply that contracts are suboptimal; equivalently, there can
be large residual agency problems and substantial managerial power in
settings where there is no excess pay.
D.

How Does One Distinguish Between Costly Contracting and
Suboptimal Contracting?

If one wishes to claim that regulation is necessary because the U.S.
governance system is suboptimal, as do Bebchuk and Fried, it is
important to be able to distinguish between: (1) contracts that are
optimal in the presence of contracting costs and (2) suboptimal
contracts. Because managerial power will be greater in both cases, it is
important to define appropriate benchmarks to establish whether
observed managerial power is evidence of suboptimal contracting or
not. One benchmark we have discussed is governance systems in other
countries. If a governance system is less efficient in one country than
another, then economic indicators such as market valuation and
productivity are expected to be lower in the country with less efficient
governance.
Holmstrom and Kaplan use stock returns and productivity growth
as a benchmark to evaluate U.S. governance and executive pay, and
conclude that U.S. shareholders should be very pleased about
corporate performance over the recent decade.29 There is no evidence
from stock returns (which is the performance measure shareholders
care about) that U.S. corporate governance in general, or U.S.
executive pay in particular, has substantially declined in
competitiveness relative to other countries over the last two decades.
As Holmstrom and Kaplan emphasize:
Although the U.S. stock market has had negative returns over the last
several years, it has performed well relative to other stock markets, both
29. Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 9.
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recently and over the longer term. In fact, the U.S. market has generated
returns at least as high as those of the European and Pacific markets
during each of the five time periods considered - since 2001, since 1997,
since 1992, since 1987, and since 1982 . . [Stock returns] reflect publicly
available information about executive compensation. Returns, therefore,
are measured net of executive compensation payments. The fact that
shareholders of U.S. companies earned higher returns even after
payments to management does not support the claim that the U.S.
executive pay system is designed inefficiently; if anything, shareholders
appear better off with the U.S. system of executive pay than with the
systems that prevail in other countries.30
So, when other countries are used as the benchmark, there is no
evidence that contracting costs have increased in the U.S., that U.S.
executives as a group have taken advantage of suboptimal contracts,
or that they have extracted rents through excess compensation.
Another approach to assess whether individual executives are
earning excess pay is to use within-country (as well as within-industry,
within-firm-size, etc.) average compensation as a benchmark. The idea
here is that a subset of firms contract more or less optimally than the
average firm, and one can estimate the magnitude of rents accruing to
managers, and the governance characteristics of firms where these
rents appear large. Note that this is an attempt to focus on variation in
the optimality of contracts as opposed to variation in contracting costs.
If contracting is costly, residual agency problems will be large and
managers will be expected to gain power over time. If this ex post
situation is considered in the ex ante structuring of contracts, one does
not expect the manager to reap rents through excess compensation
over his tenure. If some contracts are written suboptimally, however,
some managers will reap rents through excess compensation. It is not
sufficient to show that a governance feature is associated with excess
pay, unless one can also show that this compensation is the product of
suboptimal governance. Showing suboptimal governance can be
accomplished by observing whether firms with higher excess
compensation show worse performance, as is shown by Core,
Holthausen, and Larcker for a sample of U.S. firms in the 1 980s.31 This
cross-firm approach is designed to identify bad apples within an
economy. It does not tell us, however, whether a given economy
suffers from systematic governance problems as does the cross
country approach discussed above.
In contrast to these approaches that compare markets and market
outcomes, Bebchuk and Fried argue that pay structures must be
measured by the standard of arm's-length bargaining:
.

.

30. Id. at 2-4.
31. John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, CEO Compensation, and Firm
Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1999).
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The absence of arm's-length bargaining could still mean that managers
are paid too much or paid in inefficient ways. In such a market,
compensation levels could be higher than those that would prevail if
arm's-length bargaining shaped the market. Thus, when the market as a
whole is distorted by the absence of arm's-length bargaining, general
conformity to market terms cannot allay concerns about the amount and
structure of compensation.
In the end, then, the validity of the arguments for deference to market
outcomes depends on whether those outcomes are largely generated by
arm's-length negotiations between executives and self-interested
purchase [r] s of their services. (p. 22)
Essentially, they maintain that unless U.S. CEO compensation is the
product of arm's-length bargaining, it is suboptimal.
As we have discussed above, there are three problems with this
conclusion. First, it is not necessary for a contract to be the product of
arm's-length negotiations for it to be optimal. Requiring a contract to
be at arm's-length amounts to using a standard of theoretical
perfection as the benchmark, or to requiring that the world be perfect
or first-best efficient. In the eyes of Jensen and Meckling, this could be
viewed as a complaint that Nirvana does not exist.32 A second problem
is that there is no empirical evidence to suggest that the U.S.
contracting environment (as it is) is not as good as any in the world.
Third, it seems dangerous to regulate behavior according to a standard
of theoretical perfection, especially when one cannot demonstrate that
the current system is not working well. If arm's-length contracts do not
exist in the U.S., they seem unlikely to exist elsewhere in the world. If
we force firms to a standard of arm's-length contracting, how do we
know if the benefits of achieving this standard will be less than the
costs?

III. U.S. CEOS HAVE SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES
We next examine Bebchuk and Fried's second major claim: that
U.S. CEO compensation is inefficient "pay without performance." If
"pay without performance" in fact exists, it would provide evidence
that contracts are suboptimal. In this Section, we show that U.S.
compensation in fact exhibits much pay for performance, and that the
authors' claims stem from not giving sufficient weight to important
sources of incentives in U.S. CEOs' compensation contracts.
Specifically, they focus exclusively on the performance component of
annual pay (including grants of options), and fail to consider the vastly
stronger incentives provided by CEOs' equity portfolios. 33
32. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 19.
33. For instance, Bebchuk and Fried devote Chapters 11 to 14 to what they consider to
be shortcomings of what can be broadly termed grants of options and stock (i.e., that
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Bebchuk and Fried offer four main and interrelated critiques of
U.S. pay practices: (1) executive pay is too high; (2) CEO contracts do
not provide enough incentives (there is too little pay for performance);
(3) options and other equity-based pay provide "windfalls" in the
sense that they increase in value when the stock price increases, due to
market-wide factors, rather than managerial performance; and (4)
CEOs have too much freedom to unwind their incentives. As we will
make clear below, these critiques are interrelated in the sense that for
a given level of pay, if incentives are too low, then pay is too high.
As Bebchuk and Fried recognize, there are benefits and costs to
imposing incentives (pp. 1 9-20). The optimal contract imposes the
precise amount of incentives that maximizes net benefits. The benefits
of incentives are that they encourage the CEO to make the right
choices. The costs of these incentives are that the CEO must be paid
for his work, and because he is risk averse, he will demand more
compensation as the amount of incentives imposed is increased. If the
CEO's contract imposes too many incentives and offers too little pay,
the CEO will quit and work elsewhere. Conversely, if the contract
offers too much pay and imposes too few incentives, pay could be cut
or incentives could be increased or both. This is the essence of the
authors' call for "windfalls" to be removed from options: their
assumption is that by not removing the market component of options,
pay is too high, and that reducing the "windfall" market component
could reduce pay without causing the executive to quit.
A.

There A re Two Equivalent Ways of Providing Incentives

In this Section, we show there are two ways of providing
incentives: (1) by making managers' pay vary with performance, and
(2) by requiring managers to hold stock and options that vary with
performance. We will show that these two methods can provide
identical incentives, even though the observed pay is different.
Suppose that a firm is contracting optimally, and that the firm
wants to provide incentives based on market-adjusted stock returns
(the market-adjusted return is the difference between the return on
the firm's stock return and the market return). Assume that the
expected return on the firm's stock is the same as the expected return
on the market. Suppose further that the CEO has outside wealth of
$20 million. Also, assume that the optimal amount of incentives for
this CEO requires that the CEO's wealth increases (decreases) by

because these securities contain a "windfall" component, they give CEOs an unnecessarily
large compensation grant). They do not, however, balance this critique of equity grants with
a discussion of the incentive benefits that occur when CEOs hold large portfolios of stock
and options (where this portfolio comes from the accumulation of past grants of unexercised
options and unsold investments in firm stock).
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$100,000 for every percentage point that the firm's stock return
outperforms (underperforms) the market return. For example, if the
firm's stock return is 5% and the market return is 10%, the contract
requires that the CEO's wealth decrease by $500,000. This optimal
contract only rewards the CEO when firm performance exceeds
market performance, and thus is consistent with Bebchuk and Fried's
call for incentives based on peer-adjusted performance. Finally,
assume that this CEO requires $2 million in annual compensation for
him to agree to this contract.
Consider two different contracts to achieve these incentive
requirements, "Pay Incentives" and "Portfolio Incentives". The first
contract, "Pay Incentives", is a contract that consists of a salary of $2
million and a bonus that is equal to the product of $10 million and the
firm's market-adjusted return. This bonus meets the requirement that
the CEO's wealth changes by $100,000 for each 1 % deviation between
the stock return and the market return (i.e., $10 million times 1 % =
$100,000). Note that the expected bonus is $0 (because the expected
return on the firm's stock is the same as the expected return on the
market). Let us further assume, in the spirit of Bebchuk and Fried's
call for incentives based on peer-adjusted performance, that if the
firm's stock return is less than the market return (that is, the market
adj usted return is negative), the bonus is negative. For example, as
shown in Table One, if the market-adjusted return is -50%, the CEO
will have to pay the firm $5 million. The CEO's expected pay from this
contract is $2 million (= $2 million salary plus an expected bonus of
$0).
The second contract, "Portfolio Incentives", requires the CEO to
use half of his outside wealth to purchase $10 million in stock and pays
the CEO a salary of $2 million, but does not have a bonus plan.
Because this contract requires the CEO to purchase $10 million in
firm stock while selling $10 million in the market portfolio, it
effectively creates a security that has a payoff of $100,000 for each 1 %
deviation between the firm return and the market return (i.e., $10
million times the market-indexed return). Again, under the
assumption that the expected returns are the same for the firm and the
market, the expected pay from this plan is $2 million (= $2 million
salary).
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Table 1

COMPARISON OF "PAY INCENTIVES"
AND "PORTFOLIO INCENTIVES" CONTRACTS
"Pay Incentives "
CEO receives salary of $2 million, a bonus that is
equal to the product of $10 million and the firm's market-adjusted
return, and has $20 million of wealth invested in the market portfolio.
-

Firm and market stock returns

-50%
0%
-50%

0%
0%
0%

50%
0%
50%

Salary
Bonus
Change in Firm Stock Value

$2
$ (5.0)
$-

$2
$$-

$2
$ 5.0
$-

Change in market holdings

$-

$-

$-

Total wealth change

$ (3.0)

$2

$ 7.0

Firm return
Market return
Market-adjusted return
CEO compensation and incentives

"Portfolio Incentives "
CEO receives salary of $2 million, invests $10
million of wealth in firm stock, and has $10 million of wealth invested in
market.
-

Firm and market stock returns

-50%
0%
-50%

0%
0%
0%

50%
0%
50%

$2
$-

$2
$-

Change in Firm Stock Value

$2
$$
(5.0)

$-

$ 5.0

Change in market holdings

$-

$-

$-

Total wealth change

$
(3.0}

$2

$ 7.0

Firm return
Market return
Market-adjusted return
CEO compensation and incentives

Salary
Bonus
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Table One shows that these two contracts provide identical
incentives as measured by the change in CEO wealth for each 1 %
difference between the return on the firm's stock return and the
market return. The table displays payments and CEO wealth changes
associated with these contracts in three scenarios: a firm stock return
of -50 %, 0%, and 50%. To make the example more straightforward,
we assume that the market return for the year was 0%, and so the
market-adjusted returns are -50%, 0 % , and 50 % . The "Pay
Incentives" contract shown in the upper panel delivers these wealth
changes through a bonus, and the "Portfolio Incentives" contract
shown in the lower panel delivers these wealth changes through
changes in stock value. As illustrated in Table One, the two contracts
deliver identical CEO total wealth changes.34 The "Pay Incentives"
contract and the "Portfolio Incentives" contract result in identical risk
exposures and therefore identical incentives.35
In spite of identical compensation and incentives, the observed
payment stream from the two plans is quite different. Under "Pay
Incentives," the CEO's bonus will cause pay to vary with firm
performance. Under "Portfolio Incentives," the CEO will be paid $2
million no matter how bad or good firm performance is. If a
shareholder did not see the CEO's stock ownership in the proxy
statement, he might conclude that the CEO had no pay-performance
incentives. If the firm's market-adjusted return fell by 50%, however,
the CEO's wealth would be lower by $5 million, the same as in "Pay
Incentives", which would require the CEO to pay the firm $5 million.
34. This occurs because these two contracts provide identical exposure to the market
adjusted return. In the "Portfolio Incentives" contract, the manager's exposure consists of
his $10 million market portfolio and his $10 million stock portfolio. To see that the exposure
in the "Pay Incentives" contract is identical, note that the bonus is equal to the product of
$10 million and the firm's market-adjusted return. This bonus is equivalent to
simultaneously holding $10 million in firm stock and a $10 million short position in the
market portfolio, which gives a payout of $10 million times the firm return minus $10 million
times the market return, or $10 million times the market-adjusted return. Thus, the
manager's overall exposure is implicitly equivalent to a net $10 million exposure to the
market return (the manager's $20 million market portfolio less the $10 million short position
embedded in the bonus) plus a $10 million exposure to the firm's return. This is the same as
the "Portfolio Incentives" contract, in which the manager's exposure explicitly consists of his
$10 million market portfolio and his $10 million stock portfolio.
35. Although the incentives provided are the same, assuming that both the firm and the
CEO observe the terms of the contract, the "Pay Incentives" contract requires an ex post
commitment and therefore is more difficult to enforce. It requires the ability of both the firm
and the executive to commit to making cash transfers in the future when the price changes.
The executive can be tempted to renege after large price declines (when he would owe a
large bonus to the firm), and the firm can be tempted to renege after large price run-ups
(when it would owe a large bonus to the manager). Because the "Portfolio Incentives"
contract is fulfilled once the manager purchases the stock, it is simple to enforce: the
executives directly benefits from (is punished by) any stock price increases (decreases).
These contracting-enforcement difficulties may account for why most CEO contracts (at
least in the U.S.) are more consistent with the "Portfolio Incentives" contract than the "Pay
Incentives" contract. We discuss the evidence to support this claim below.
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"Pay Incentives'', though, would show highly variable total CEO pay,
and a naive analysis might conclude that pay-performance incentives
for "Pay Incentives" were much greater than "Portfolio Incentives,"
even though they are identical.
B.

Most U. S. C EOs' Incentives A re Provided by Their Stock and
Option Portfolios

U.S. executive incentives are designed much more like "Portfolio
Incentives" than "Pay Incentives." In other words, pay for
performance is provided primarily though executive stock and option
holdings. This fact has been established in the literature at least since
Jensen and Murphy's study in 1990.36 Bebchuk and Fried do not
consider this point and assert that U.S. executive incentives should
follow "Pay Incentives," which predicts much variation in flow pay
when performance varies. This perspective ignores the fact, however,
that executives' stock and option portfolios are the primary source of
incentives. Hall and Liebman summarize this common misperception
in the abstract to their 1998 paper:
A common view is that there is little correlation between firm
performance and CEO pay. Using a new fifteen-year panel data set of
CEOs in the largest, publicly traded U.S. companies, we document a
strong relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation.
This relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of
CEO holdings of stock and stock options.37
Thus, the fact that CEO pay does not vary much with performance
does not mean that CEOs have no incentives or that CEO pay is
inappropriate. Rather, equity portfolios, which are structured similarly
to our "Portfolio Incentives" example, provide U.S. CEOs with strong
incentives.

36. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management
POL. ECON. 225 (1990).

Incentives, 98 J.

37. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, A re CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113
Q.J. ECON. 653, 653 (1998).
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TABLE 2
MEDIAN CEO PAY, PORTFOLIO VALUE, AND
INCENTIVES FOR S&P 500 FIRMS: 1993 TO 200338
(1 )

. (2 )
Beginning-

Year

Total

of-Year

Annual Pay

Portfolio
Value

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

(3)

(4)

Beginning-

Fraction of

of-Year

Value

Incentives

Vested

$1,983,000
2,444,000
2,765,000
3,257,000
3,989,000
4,578,000
5,470,000
6,947,000
7,351,000
6,585,000
6,578,000

$9,275,000
10,306,000
10,623,000
13,220,000
19,574,000
27,563,000
37,041,000
43,484,000
50,215,000
38,105,000
30,137,000

$125,000
152,000
157,000
191,000
286,000
403,000
492,000
567,000
647,000
552,000
430,000

76.7%
75.6%
70.8%
72.8%
71.3%
69.2%
65.9%
63.8%
60. 1 %
58.8%
52.8%

12.7%

12.5%

13.2%

-3.7%

Tenyear
growth
rate

Total Annual Pay is the median

CEO

salary, bonus, stock and option

grants, and other pay for the year shown.

Beginning-of-Year Portfolio Value is the median total value of stock
exercisable and unexercisable options held by the

CEO

at the beginning

of the year shown.

Beginning-of-Year Incentives is an estimate of the change in the
beginning-of-year value of

CEO

stock and option holdings for a

1%

change in stock price.

Fraction of Value Vested is the fraction of beginning-of-year portfolio
value that the

CEO could obtain if all vested stock was sold and

all vested

in-the-money options were exercised (for options, the value vested is the

38. For details of sample selection and variable measurement, see appendix, infra pp.
1 43-44.
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intrinsic value, which is equal to the beginning-of-year stock price less the
exercise price times the number of options).
Table Two illustrates the magnitude of equity incentives held by
U.S. CEOs relative to their pay. The Table shows data on annual
compensation and beginning-of-year portfolio value and incentive
data for S&P 500 CEOs from 1 993-2003 {the data and computations
are described in greater detail in the appendix). Column One shows
total annual pay for the median CEO. The second column shows the
beginning-of-year market value of the median CEO's stock and option
portfolio. The third column shows a measure of the median CEO's
beginning-of-year incentives. Following the method developed by
Jensen and Murphy,39 we measure incentives as the increase
(decrease) in the value of the CEO's stock and option portfolio that
occurs when the stock price increases {decreases) by 1 % . For an
example of the interpretation of this measure, consider the median
CEO in 1993. Suppose that this CEO's firm experienced a return of
-20% during the year. Then the CEO's portfolio would decrease in
value by $8.6 million ( -20 times $430,000 in incentives). Thus, as
discussed by Hall and Liebman, these CEOs can lose large amounts of
their wealth when prices fall. Note that this $8.6 million decrease is
larger than the median CEO's pay for 2003 of $6.6 million.
Table Two illustrates the Hall and Liebman point that because of
their large stock and option portfolios, U.S. CEOs experience very
large wealth changes when the stock price changes. In other words,
U.S. CEO compensation is structured very much like the "Portfolio
Incentives" example above: large stock prices will cause large changes
in the value of the CEO's portfolio and wealth even though changes in
annual pay may be fairly small. Consequently, U.S. CEOs have very
large pay-performance incentives, and an assertion that U.S. CEOs
receive "pay without performance" is clearly inconsistent with the
evidence. However, it is easy to see why this is what Hall and Liebman
call a "common view" and a common mistake. If one does not
consider the very large incentives delivered by CEO equity portfolios,
one could come to the false conclusion that CEOs have low incentives
because their pay does not vary strongly with performance.
In a related vein, one must consider executive incentive levels in
any analysis of whether executive pay levels are appropriate, because
ignoring the very large incentives delivered by U.S. CEO equity
portfolios could lead one to the false conclusion that U.S. CEOs are
overpaid. It is widely agreed, and accepted by Bebchuk and Fried, that
firms should provide incentives that link managerial wealth to firm
performance. Imposing incentives on the CEO benefits the firm
=

39. Jensen & Murphy, supra note 36.
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because it aligns the CEO's and the shareholders' objectives: when
shareholders' wealth increases or decreases, so does the CEO's. At the
same time, however, greater incentives come at a cost because
executives require greater pay to bear the risks associated with greater
incentive levels.40 An executive who is required to bear $10 million in
incentives will require more pay than if she was required to bear only
$5 million in incentives.
Many misconceptions about the magnitude of U.S. CEO pay arise
because the observer did not consider (1) the magnitude of U.S. CEO
incentives, and (2) that higher pay is necessary when incentives are
higher. For example, U.S. CEOs have higher pay than their European
and Japanese counterparts, which could lead the naive observer to
conclude that U.S. CEOs are overpaid. Yet, U.S. CEOs' incentives are
much higher as well, suggesting that their compensation needs to be
higher to account for the additional risk they bear. Conyon and
Murphy's study of executive compensation in the U .K. illustrates this
point: they found that U.S. CEOs in 1 997 made about 2.7 times more
than their British counterparts, but that U.S. CEOs also held 4.2 times
more stock.41 Given the larger incentives held by U.S. CEOs, it is not
clear that U.S. CEOs are overpaid relative to their British
counterparts.
This predicted economic relation between incentives and pay can
also be applied to the growth in CEO pay over the last decade, the
same growth that Bebchuk and Fried use to motivate their book:
During the extended bull market of the 1990s, executive compensation at
public companies - companies whose shares are traded on stock
exchanges - soared to unprecedented levels. (p. 1)
Bebchuk and Fried want to use this pay growth as prima facie
evidence of a problem with pay. What is wrong with this approach is
the following: if efficient contracts call for an increase in CEO
incentives over time, this increases the amount of risk that these
executives bear, and make it optimal for pay to rise with the increased
incentives. Accordingly, it is not correct to point to the growth in pay
as a problem without considering the growth in incentives. If there is a
large growth in pay without a corresponding growth in incentives, this
is stronger evidence of problems with pay. If, however, pay and

40. Bebchuk and Fried recognize that efficient contracting predicts that pay will be
higher when incentives are higher: "Linking compensation to performance may require a
company to increase an executive's level of compensation because pay that is sensitive to
performance is less valuable to managers than fixed pay with the same expected value." P.
19.
41. Martin J. Conyon & Kevin J. Murphy, The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the
United States and the United Kingdom, 110 ECON. J. F. 640 (2000). The study is a comparison
of median data for CEOs in 1997 that run companies with 200 to 500 million pounds of sales.
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incentives grow simultaneously, this growth is consistent with efficient
contracting.
Table Two shows that during the period from 1993 to 2003, high
pay growth went hand-in-hand with high growth in incentives. Column
One illustrates that the median CEO's total pay increased from $2
million in 1993 to $6.6 million in 2003, an annual increase of 12.7%
over the ten-year period. Over this same period, however, the market
value of the median CEO's beginning-of-year stock and option
portfolio grew at almost exactly the same rate, from $9.3 million at the
beginning of 1993 to $30.1 million at the beginning of 2003, or an
annual increase of 12.5 % (see Column Two).42 Similarly, Column
Three of Table Two shows that the median incentives provided by the
CEOs' beginning-of-year stock and option portfolios increased from
$125,000 for each 1 % increase in the stock price in 1993 to $430,000
for each 1 % increase in the stock price in 2003, or an annual growth of
13.2 % . These statistics are consistent with efficient contracts that pay
more as: (1) incentives grow, and (2) the size and complexity of the
organization grows.
We want to emphasize that the fact that pay and incentives grow at
the same rate does not imply that pay is necessarily optimal. For
example, CEOs could have been overpaid both in 1 993 and in 2003. In
addition, pay growth is optimal only if the incentive growth is optimal.
While Bebchuk and Fried take the position that due to their power,
executives hold too few incentives, one could imagine a recasting of
the "outrage cost" argument to yield a result that executives hold too
many incentives. For example, if shareholders got outraged when
executives sold stock, powerful executives might agree to hold excess
incentives in exchange for excess pay.43
We do not claim that U.S. pay packages are optimal, but we
instead point out that one can make no claim about the optimality of
pay packages if one ignores the major source of incentives in those
packages. Pay and incentives must be considered together. Second, as
discussed above, even with a correct understanding of pay and the
structure of incentives, it is not possible to show that pay is suboptimal
without comparing it across firms or countries. It is correct that U.S.
CEO incentives and pay are large both by recent historical standards
and relative to other countries, and that they have grown during the
1990s. However, there is little if any empirical evidence that shows

42. During this time, the size of the median S&P 500 firm also increased substantially:
the market value of the median S&P 500 company increased from $3.6 billion in 1993 to $9.1
billion in 2003, or an annual increase of 9.6% over the ten years ended 2003.
43. As evidenced by their claim that executives have "[b]road freedom to unwind equity
incentives," Bebchuk and Fried do not seem to think that share sales are a source of outrage.
P. 178. See, for example, their discussion that suggests low outrage because stock sales are
not salient. Id.
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that U.S. CEO pay, or its growth, is suboptimal. As discussed above,
Holmstrom and Kaplan find that U.S. stock market performance and
productivity growth through 2002 are as good as those in any other
country, offering no evidence that U. S. compensation practices have
grown worse relative to those in the rest of the world.
C.

Do U. S. CEOs Receive "Windfalls "?

We tum next to Bebchuk and Fried's claim that executives are
gaining "windfalls," especially in their equity-based pay. They state,
"[w]hen managers are rewarded for market- and sector-wide price
movements unrelated to their efforts, shareholders' money is not well
spent" (p. 139). Their complaint about stock and options is that the
market component reflects pay that does not increase incentives. If
these "windfalls" were removed, they go on to say, "the same amount
of incentives can be provided at a lower cost, or more incentives can
be provided at the same cost" (p. 1 90). Embedded in this statement is
an assumption that the CEO is being paid too much, which the authors
have not demonstrated. If the CEO is being paid too much, the
statement is true for any component of compensation. For example, if
the CEO has too much cash pay, his pay can be cut or his incentives
increased without causing him to quit.
In this Section, though, we want to focus on why this is an unfair
criticism of the design of equity compensation. To see why this is
wrong in general, consider the "Portfolio Incentives" compensation
arrangement discussed previously, which imposed the optimal level of
incentives by requiring the executive to hold $10 million of his wealth
in firm stock. Recall that in this example, the executive was being paid
the least amount that would cause him to agree to the contract, and
that the cost-minimizing contract also required a compensation
payment of $2 million to the executive. Suppose that instead of paying
this amount in cash, the firm paid the executive in stock worth $2
million. The executive could sell this stock for cash and obtain $2
million (under the simplifying assumption of no trading costs). Stock is
an option with an exercise price of $0, so this stock grant is
conceptually the same as an option grant, and we use this stock grant
to illustrate our point.
Bebchuk and Fried claim that firms could use market-indexed
equity to either create "the same amount of incentives . . . at a lower
cost, or more incentives . . . at the same cost."44 Our example shows
that this claim is not generally correct. Suppose the example firm
continues to impose $10 million in stock price risk on the executive,
44. P. 190. Although not true in general, the claim will be true when the executive is
overpaid. In this case, the claim amounts to a statement that it is efficient to cut pay when
the executive is overpaid.
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but tries to pay less money by giving indexed stock instead of straight
stock. This indexed stock would be worth less than $2 million, and the
executive would quit because his pay was lower than that required
under the contract. Alternatively, suppose that the firm tried to
impose more incentives on the executive for the same amount of
money by paying the executive $2 million in stock but not allowing the
executive to sell stock in response. Now the executive holds $ 12
million in stock. These increased incentives would raise the risk
premium required by the executive, and he would quit unless his
compensation was increased as well.
The example above illustrates that so long as an executive is not
overpaid, incentives and pay must move together, and firms cannot
unilaterally increase incentives without increasing pay, or vice versa.
To show that there is something wrong with option plans requires
showing that the manager is overpaid. To this point, as we showed
earlier, although U.S. CEOs receive high pay relative to CEOs in
other countries, they also hold substantially more incentives than
CEOs in other countries. As a result, there is no conclusive evidence
that U.S. CEO pay is inappropriately high given the incentive risk
these individuals are required to bear. Further, the fact that stock and
options have a market component does not imply that a manager is
overpaid, nor does it imply that a contract is suboptimal. As described
above, the purpose of the market component is not to provide
incentives, but to deliver pay.
A further criticism of the authors' "windfall" argument is that it
presumes that CEO contracts exhibit "too much" exposure to market
performance, and that market-adjusting stock and options is necessary
to remove this excess market exposure. To see the flaw in this
argument, it is again important to recognize that U.S. CEOs get nearly
all of their incentives from their stock and option portfolios, as in the
"Portfolio Incentives" plan. A nai"ve analysis will call these stock and
option portfolios "puzzling" because they increase in value when the
market portfolio increases in value. The "Portfolio Incentives" plan
contract, however, increases the manager's exposure to firm-specific
performance, without changing his market exposure.
To see this, remember that the CEO in Table One with the
"Portfolio Incentives" plan has $20 million in outside wealth that he
prefers to invest in the market portfolio. The CEO's "Portfolio
Incentives" contract requires him to place $10 million of that wealth in
firm stock. Note that the stock return Rfinn is the sum of the market
return Rmarket and the firm-specific net-of-market return Rfinn - Rmarke•:
Rfirm Rmarket + (Rfinn - �arke.).
Therefore, when the executive holds $10 million in firm stock, it is
the same as if he held $10 million in the market index and $10 million
in an indexed security with return Rfirm - Rmarkei· The executive's actual
=
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portfolio is no more correlated with market movements than the "Pay
Incentives" contract.45
Bebchuk and Fried accept this point:
Some economists, however, have argued that executives might in fact be
interested in investing in a market-wide portfolio and, if given cash,
would invest it in such a portfolio. On this view, giving executives
conventional options is not more puzzling than giving them indexed
options plus a large amount of cash. Indeed, assuming that the managers
are likely to invest the cash in a market-wide portfolio, giving
compensation to them in the form of conventional options might be
simpler.
We have no quarrel with this analysis. Conventional options may well
be no more puzzling than a combination of indexed options and a very
large amount of cash . . . . Our point, simply, is that a large portion of the
value of conventional options - which have been widely considered to
be "performance-based pay" - is in fact decoupled from performance.
(p. 157; citations omitted)
In other words, there is no "puzzle" about the fact that stock and
options are not indexed. This practice is completely consistent with
optimal contracting, and calling it "windfalls" is misleading and wrong.
The point "that a large portion of the value of conventional options which have been widely considered to be 'performance-based pay' is in fact decoupled from performance" simply restates the fact that
U.S. firms have "Portfolio Incentives" pay schemes: it is well known
that most CEOs' incentives come from their portfolios and that their
annual pay varies little with performance.

D.

Do U. S. CEOs Unwind Their Incentives?

Bebchuk and Fried further claim that CEOs have broad "freedom
to unwind incentives," and that they use this freedom to exercise
options and sell stock that the shareholders would prefer the CEOs to
hold. If a CEO could unwind his equity holdings at will, one would
expect CEOs to hold little if any unrestricted firm stock, and to
exercise their options as soon as they became exercisable and far
enough in-the-money to reap a reasonable fraction of the options'
value.
This claim is not well supported, however, by empirical evidence.
CEO equity holdings are not low in the U.S., but instead are in
general larger than in any other country. Further, CEO equity

45. The idea that nonindexed grants of stock and options do not impose excess market
risk on executives is becoming well-recognized. Core et al., supra note 9; Gerald Garvey &
Todd Milbourn, Executive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence
of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section, 58 J. FIN. 1557 (2003); Li Jin, CEO
Compensation, Diversification, and Incentives, 66 J. FIN. ECON. (2002).
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holdings are not in decline but, as documented by Hall and Liebman
and in the data we presented above, have in fact risen substantially
over the last twenty years. This increase in value over time shows the
authors have overstated their claim that managers have almost
unfettered discretion to sell their vested stock and options. As shown
in the Column Four of Table Two, empirically in 2003, the median
CEO could realize about 53% of the value of his portfolio by
exercising and selling vested stock and options. These CEOs, however,
did not do so.46
Further, Table Two shows a declining trend in the fraction of the
CEOs' portfolio that is vested and realizable. This decline stems from
the fact that a greater fraction of CEOs' equity portfolios in 2003 is
due to option holdings. The value of an option consists of the
realizable intrinsic value, which is equal to the beginning-of-year stock
price less the exercise price, plus the time value that comes from
expected stock price increases over the term of the option. The early
exercise of options destroys the time value of the options, thereby
encouraging the executive to hold options even after vesting. In 2003,
many CEOs' options were out-of-the-money, in which case all of the
options' value is due to time value. This evidence suggests that an
increasing use of options has likely reduced CEOs' ability to unwind
their incentives and has contributed to the observed growth in CEO
equity incentives.47
One might also ask, if CEOs knew that they had bad incentives
and would conduct future "rent-extraction" activities and make
decisions that would destroy value, why would they not sell their stock
today to avoid these future costs?48 Why would they own any stock at
all? After all, if the CEO takes an action to destroy shareholder value,
that action destroys the value of his or her portfolio as well. If CEOs
were extracting rents and could sell stock at will, one would expect the
46. Although there is a declining trend in the percentage of value vested during this time
period, executives are holding much more equity now than in 1993. Thus, the dollar value of
their vested holdings is far greater today than it was ten years ago, even though the fraction
of value vested is lower.
47. Some of these CEOs could be hedging the firm-specific risk in their equity portfolios
through derivative securities such as caps and collars that are negatively correlated with
firm-specific price changes. These instruments can reduce the CEO's exposure to the firm's
stock price and the price-based incentives provided by their portfolios. Recent research by
Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon indicates that some CEOs use these techniques, but the small
sample size suggests that this behavior is limited. J. Carr Bettis et al., Managerial Ownership,
Incentive Contracting, and the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate
Insiders, 36 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 345 (2001). Although it is possible that some

CEOs engage in this behavior and do not file required SEC disclosures, the fact that secret
hedging activities violate SEC disclosure and insider trading rules reduces the likelihood that
this behavior is widespread.
48. Even though rational shareholders in equilibrium price-protect against the
probability that value destruction will occur, the price will still fall at the time the value
destruction becomes certain.
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median CEO to own no stock and to exercise his options as soon as
they became exercisable and far enough in-the-money to reap a
reasonable fraction of the options' value. To summarize, if in fact a
CEO could sell without constraints, one would expect that CEO to
own no stock.
A final point on unwinding incentives is that, in some cases, it is
optimal for the firm to allow and even encourage the CEO to sell
equity. For example, restricted stock and options are sometimes used
as a substitute for cash pay. In these cases, the reason for granting
equity to the CEO is not to increase incentives. As highlighted above,
it is costly for a firm to impose greater incentives on the CEO than is
optimal. Therefore, when equity pay is used as a substitute for cash
pay, the CEO should be allowed to rebalance his portfolio. As another
example, consider the case where the stock price has risen
substantially faster than the market over a number of years. As the
CEO's portfolio of stock and options becomes a greater proportion of
his overall wealth, incentives could increase beyond the optimal level.
In addition to the higher risk premiums the CEO will demand,
unnecessarily high incentives can also cause the CEO to behave in an
overly risk-averse manner, thereby shunning valuable, but risky,
projects. Again, in these settings, it is optimal to allow the CEO to
exercise options and sell stock to rebalance his portfolio.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: DOES U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
NEED TO BE FIXED?
To conclude, we briefly summarize our main points and discuss a
few of Bebchuk and Fried's policy conclusions. First, the authors have
offered no persuasive evidence that CEO pay contracts are
systematically suboptimal. In other words, they have provided some
interesting examples of bad apples, but have not offered evidence or a
theory to show that the entire barrel is bad. As we discussed in Part II,
in many settings where managerial power exists, observed contracts
anticipate and try to minimize its costs and therefore may in fact be
optimal. The optimal contract and managerial power perspectives are
not competing explanations of executive pay. It is true that contract
structures reflect CEO power, and that CEOs with more power get
more pay, but this fact does not mean that CEO pay is not optimized
for shareholders, nor does it imply that CEO pay needs reform.
Second, when Bebchuk and Fried advance their central argument
that U.S. executives' compensation is inefficient "pay without
performance," they ignore executives' stock and option portfolios,
which are the primary source of their incentives. Once we factor in
these very large stock and option portfolios, it becomes apparent that
corporate executives have very large pay-performance incentives.
Without considering the very large incentives delivered by CEO
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equity portfolios, one could come to the false conclusions that CEOs
have low incentives because their annual pay does not vary strongly
with performance, or that CEOs are overpaid. We do not claim that
U.S. pay packages are optimal, but we instead point out that one can
make no claim about the optimality of annual pay packages if one
ignores the maj or source of incentives in executives' portfolios.
Bebchuk and Fried's policy recommendations for government
intervention are based on their assessment that executive pay practices
are failing, which we do not believe to be true. Therefore, we see no
broad justification for the policy recommendations they give. Holding
this aside, some of their proposals seem sensible. For example, we
agree that better disclosure on the value of executive pensions and the
exercise and sale of options and shares would be beneficial. We also
agree that we see no reason that stock options should not be expensed
for accounting purposes.
With regards to their more sweeping proposals, however, Bebchuk
and Fried have not provided evidence of why more needs to be done.
They have shown some potential benefits from changing governance
practices, but have not provided a thorough discussion of the costs of
these changes, and therefore no means of assessing whether the
proposed changes have net benefits. For example, it is conceivable
that corporate governance practices would be improved by increasing
director independence through implementation of the shareholder
nomination rule. Yet, as we pointed out in Section II.B, it may be too
costly and therefore not optimal for a board to be completely
independent. In addition, there is a limited pool of qualified outside
directors, and increasing the demand for talent from that pool is likely
to be very costly. The focus should not be on maximizing board
independence, but on selecting a board structure that maximizes share
value, which may include having inside directors and which likely will
differ from a board structure optimized solely for making
compensation decisions.
Finally, a number of their specific proposals for reforming pay
ignore the role played by stock and option portfolios. Because these
proposals are based on incomplete analysis, or false premises, their
merit is questionable. First, as discussed above, their proposal that
stock and stock options should be indexed to filter out any general
market increases is ignores key aspects of how equity portfolios
provide incentives. The objective of requiring executives to hold
options is to force the executive to hold less than the desired level of
some diversified portfolio, and more than the desired level of firm
specific equity. Traditional stock and options without indexing achieve
this objective: executives would prefer to liquidate their stock and
option portfolio and invest it in a diversified portfolio. Any argument
for indexed stock and options must show that the benefits of creating
these new securities exceed their costs, and that the resulting securities
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are more efficient than the existing simple securities currently used to
achieve the contracting objective. Second, they propose that more
stringent stock- and option-holding requirements should be imposed
on top executives. This proposal is based on their claim that it is easy
for executives to unload stock and that executives hold too few
incentives. We show that executive equity holdings are large and
growing even though most of the value of executives' holdings is
vested and tradeable. While it may be useful to impose additional
restrictions on executive portfolios, it is important to determine
whether additional incentives are necessary and to consider the costs
of the additional incentives. As we have discussed throughout this
Review, a cost of higher incentives is higher pay. Finally, their
recommendation that pay be made more sensitive to performance
stems from a failure to adequately consider the primary source of U.S.
CEOs' incentives. U.S. CEOs do in fact have very strong pay-for
performance equity incentives (more than in any other country in the
world) through their stock and option portfolios.
Overall though, we emphasize that Professors Bebchuk and Fried
have written a provocative book that is at the center of the current
debate about executive compensation. Any scholar who wishes to
participate in and advance this debate must understand the arguments
in Pay Without Performance as well as their limitations.
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APPENDIX - DATA ON U.S. CEO PAY AND INCENTIVES
The data we show in Table Two are annual compensation and
incentives of S&P 500 CEOs from 1 993 to 2003. We use the S&P 500
as a comparison group over time because the index is comprised of the
largest and most successful companies in the U.S.49 We use
Execucomp as our source for compensation data, and we obtain data
on the S&P 500 composition and on firm market value from
Compustat. We require data on CEO tenure, and we exclude CEOs
who are not in office for a full year. We also require data on the
CEOs' stock and option ownership at the beginning of the year. As
shown in the first column of the Table, these data requirements yield
an annual sample of about 400 CEOs (out of 500 companies).
The numbers shown are in actual dollars and are not inflation
adjusted. We examine medians, not means.50 There are some CEOs in
our sample who are paid nothing in a year and others who are paid
huge amounts. These outliers distort the average as a summary
measure, but have no effect on the median. We therefore use medians
to avoid the influence of extreme cases in our data, and instead
examine what is typical for the largest and most successful firms in the
world.
Stock and option portfolios provide CEOs with incentives because
they change in value with the stock price, an important performance
measure over which the CEO exerts some control. Following the
method developed by Jensen and Murphy,51 we measure incentives as
the increase (decrease) in the value of the CEO's stock and option
portfolio that occurs when the stock price increases (decreases) by
1 % . Stock holdings increase one-for-one with the stock price. In other
words, if the firm has a stock return of 1 % , the CEO's stock portfolio
increases in value by 1 % . If the median CEO in 1993 held all stock, his
portfolio, which has a value of $9.3 million, would provide $93,000 in
incentives by this measure. In other words, when the stock price
decreases by 1 % , $9.3 million in stock falls in value by $93,000. But
these CEOs own a combination of stock and options, and a given
dollar amount of options increases (decreases) in value more than the
49. The S&P 500 "includes 500 leading companies in leading industries of the U.S.
economy. Although the S&P 500 focuses on the large-cap segment of the market, with over
80% coverage of U.S. equities it is also an ideal proxy for the total market." S&P 500
Factsheet, at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/500factsheet.pdf (last visited
Mar. 6, 2005).
50. The trend in median data is quite similar to the trend in average data documented
by Hall and Murphy, and others, and we see the same trend when we look at averages in our
data. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. PERSP.
49 (2003).
51. Jensen & Murphy, supra note 36.
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same dollar amount of stock. In other words, if the firm has a stock
return of 1 % , the CEO's option portfolio increases in value by more
than 1 % . To estimate the value and incentives provided by the CEO's
option portfolio at the end of a year t, we use the method developed
by Core and Guay.52 We modify this method by assuming times-to
exercise equal to 70% of the Core and Guay assumed times-to
maturity.

52. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option
Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 613 (2002).

